Sneaking In Through the Back
Door?
Media Company Interests and Dual Ownership of Clubs in Football
By Dr Adam Brown
Research Fellow, Manchester Institute for Popular Culture,
Manchester Metropolitan University
Contents
Introduction
1. Media Ownership
2. Dual Ownership
Introduction
This paper outlines the main recent developments in the media
ownership of English football clubs and highlights the dangers these
pose for football. It focuses on two main concerns:
- media penetration of football club ownership; and
- the dual ownership of clubs.
It argues that the key decisions of the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission - designed to protect competition within the pay TV sports
market - and the Restrictive Practices Court - that it is in the
public interest to maintain the collective negotiation of TV rights
and its concomitant redistribution of moneys - are both in jeopardy
because of recent moves by broadcast companies to own stakes in clubs.
Further, these developments have also raised concerns over the dual
ownership of clubs. These problems are exacerbated because it is media
companies involved, but dual ownership per se is something
which has been outlawed by football authorities here and across
Europe.
The paper concludes that only quick and robust action by
competition authorities and the football authorities will protect
football and the pay TV market from undue influence and unfair
competition by some companies. The Government has shown itself to be
prepared to call in competition authorities to protect competition in
the pay TV field and it now needs to secure the progress already made.
The football authorities have an obligation to uphold their own rules
regarding the dual ownership of clubs by outlawing the integration of
media companies into the ownership of more than one club. At a time
when there is unprecedented interest in the regulation and governance
of football, these developments pose a serious challenge to existing
regulatory structures and, crucially, will test the efficacy of those
structures.
Back to Contents
1. Media Ownership
Recent Decisions
There have been two key decisions in relation to the ownership of
clubs and the negotiation of television rights this year. It is worth
remembering what they said.
Monopolies and Mergers Commission
The MMC was asked by the Office of Fair Trading to investigate the
merger of BSkyB and Manchester United. Their report was unequivocal in
its opposition to the merger, a report which was subsequently accepted
in full by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Stephen
Byers on April 9 1999.
Their main areas of concern were:
-
That the merger would be anti-competitive in the pay TV market
because it would give BSkyB an unfair advantage in the negotiation
of Premier League and other TV rights.
-
That such an advantage would be exacerbated by the already
dominant position of BSkyB and the market power of Manchester
United.
-
That such an advantage could not be overcome by the imposition
of 'Chinese walls' (barriers to the flow of information such as
between subsidiary and parent boards), non-exclusive deals or even
exclusion from the rights negotiations.
-
That the merger would also damage the quality of British
football by increasing the 'wealth gap' between rich and poorer
clubs through a greater retention of TV revenue by the most
popular clubs.
-
That the merger would give BSkyB additional influence over
Premier League decisions which would be against the long term
interests of the game.
Restrictive Practices Court
Following complaints from cable TV operators, the Office of Fair
Trading took the Premier League, BBC and BSkyB to court. This was on
the grounds that the sale of live PL TV rights to BSkyB and BBC was
both collective and exclusive. The OFT believed that: a) the Premier
League were acting as a cartel in their sale of rights and as such
were being anti-competitive; and b) that the 'exclusive' nature of the
deal was restrictive in that it prevented other TV companies screening
games which BSkyB chose not to.
After a nine-month court case, the judge (Mr Justice Ferris) ruled
in favour of the Premier League. In this second land mark case, he
again raised the 'public interest' concerns he had with the way
football is financed through television. In particular he supported
the notion that the collective sale of rights allowed for the
redistribution of income in the game:
"Indeed we see no need to differ from the view of the
Football task Force that, from the public point of view, it is
desirable that resources generated by professional football should
be invested to a greater extent than at present in the lower levels
of the game. The removal of restrictions now under consideration
would therefore deny to the public a benefit or advantage."
Back to Contents
Unfinished Business
However, despite these unequivocal rulings, a number of matters
remain unclear in relation to both cases.
In his statement to the Stock Exchange on April 9 1999, Trade
Secretary Stephen Byers acknowledged the MMC's concern "about the
scope for the competition authorities to examine mergers involving
football clubs". Primarily, most clubs fall below the �70m
threshold to be considered "qualifying mergers", and
existing regulations seem unclear about the partial purchase of clubs
by media companies. Byers announced that he would seek views on
whether changes were needed in the guidelines so that other club
mergers could be examined, with particular reference to public
interest concerns. No such changes have yet been announced by the DTI
and this has allowed the developments outlined below to happen.
In fact, no take-overs have occurred since the MMC decision on
BSkyB/Manchester United. Indeed, financial analysts believe that
"predictions that broadcasting companies would rush to snap
up clubs to gain ownership of valuable media content have proved
unfounded, not least because of regulatory hostility to such
potentially anti-competitive deals. A few media groups have bought
small stakes in some clubs, but beyond these, take-over interest has
all but died." (FT Patrick Harveson, 4.11.99)
Of primary concern now, therefore, is the question of whether the
recent spate of media companies buying minority stakes in clubs do, in
fact, raise many of the same problems which the MMC highlighted. The
adequacy of the regulatory functions of both football and competition
authorities to protect the long term interests of the game is now
being tested.
Back to Contents
Recent Developments
In recent months a number of developments have occurred in relation
to the media ownership of football clubs.
NTL and Newcastle
NTL, who hold a 6% stake in Newcastle United, withdrew their
take-over offer in the light of the MMC's ruling in April 1999.
However, they maintain their stake in the club. NTL are quite open
about why they continue to hold their 6% stake in Newcastle United. In
an email letter dated 27 October 2020 (see Appendix), Bruce Randall,
NTL's Public Relations manager, outlined the reasons for their
continued investment thus:
"NTL is interested in gaining a seat at the negotiating
table when it comes to television rights... We believe that entering
into a partnership with Newcastle United is an excellent opportunity
for us to enter the UK sports pay TV market... Clearly, media
companies like ours taking stakes in football clubs puts them in a
better position to be involved in screening top level football in
the UK."
The motives are crystal clear here: NTL see their investment in
Newcastle as strategic in that it buys them something more than a
return on their stock - it buys them a seat at the negotiating table
for TV rights. This should set alarm bells ringing with those
authorities who blocked BSkyB's take-over of Manchester United on
these grounds.
Granada TV and Liverpool
Granada Television bought a 10% stake in Liverpool - still a
limited company - on 13 July 2020 for �22m. "The deal,"
said the Guardian, "effectively earns the television company a
seat in football rights negotiations," and a "senior Granada
executive" would be appointed to the board. The role in relation
to TV rights negotiations, said Chief Executive Rick Parry, would be
to "advise, guide and represent us". [Guardian 14.7.99]
Again, it is clear that this investment is not straightforward in that
it has additional benefits and roles for Granada, primary of which is
increasing their chances of accessing live football.
BSkyB and Manchester United
Having lost their bid to take-over Manchester United, BSkyB
maintain their 11.1% stake in the club. Due to the sale of shares by
Chief Executive Martin Edwards in October, BSkyB are now by far the
club's biggest shareholders and they also maintain their one-third
ownership of MUTV.
BSkyB and Leeds United
In August 1999 BSkyB announced that it was to take a 9.9% stake in
Leeds Sporting, the listed parent company of Leeds United. Following
the approval of shareholders, 9.2% of Leeds was sold to BSkyB for �13.8m
on 11 October 2020. Central to the deal was the agreement that BSkyB
would act as "media advisors" for Leeds United and that they
would take a huge 30% commission on any increase in revenue from
television contracts over the next five years. Again the nature of the
deal leaves no doubt as to BSkyB's expectations to be centrally
involved in the negotiations for TV rights.
BSkyB and Manchester City
In November 1999, BSkyB secured a similar deal with First Division
leaders Manchester City, like Liverpool, not a listed company. Here
BSkyB bought 9.9% for �7.5m and they have a very similar deal as with
Leeds to act as media agents for the club with similar remuneration.
BSkyB's role is not to invest in Manchester City merely for the
possible long term return that might give, but to place the company in
a strategic position with regard to the negotiation of TV rights.
It is not unlikely that further penetration of football club
ownership by these and other media companies is likely in the near
future - it is reported privately that a number of deals are already
in progress. The current collective Premier League TV deal is due for
re-negotiation in 2001, with speculation already mounting about
possible bids. Questions still remain over the nature of these
forthcoming negotiations - although the Premier League remains
committed to collective negotiation, whether this happens and whether
it allows non-exclusive deals to be made are still uncertain. Thus,
the developments outlined above suggest that media companies are
positioning themselves to influence those negotiations. As such,
nothing short of the free and open competition in the pay TV market as
well as football's ability to determine its own future and structures
of finance are threatened. Furthermore:
-
it is clear that BSkyB's roles at Manchester City and Leeds
United will be to negotiate media deals on behalf of the club.
This places BSkyB at a clear and blatant advantage to other
broadcasters in relation to the sale of those clubs' TV rights.
-
as the dominant shareholders in Manchester United and as
partners in MUTV, BSkyB have a similarly powerful position in
relation to this club's negotiations, which the MMC have already
highlighted have an unusually powerful position in the discreet
market of pay TV Premier League football.
-
Granada's position as media agents at Liverpool and NTL's
openly stated reasons for investing in Newcastle United illustrate
clearly that their aim is to secure access to screening live
football of their respective clubs.
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Threats to Competition
These factors mean that the ownership changes outlined pose a
significant and serious threat to football and to competition within
the UK pay TV market for a number of reasons. There are a number of
scenarios.
-
BSkyB could have tie-ins with three clubs in the Premier
League, should Manchester City get promoted. This will
significantly increase their ability to win future rights for
Premier League matches, when, as the MMC concluded, they already
enjoyed great market power and any extension of this would be
damaging to competition.
-
It is perfectly possible that through purchasing stakes in a
number more clubs, BSkyB could effectively 'buy' enough votes at
the Premier League to block any other broadcaster getting the
collective Premier League contract. Ironically, this would be
achieved for considerably less than their attempted take-over of
Manchester United.
-
Even if no more stakes of clubs are taken, the broadcaster will
have, through its stakes in Manchester United and Leeds, access to
privileged information in relation to the sale of Premier League
broadcasting rights. The same applies to NTL and Granada. As the
MMC concluded, "no undertakings... could ever prevent the
informal flows of information, nor would they prevent [the clubs]
influencing the rights negotiations in advance of the formal
negotiations." The broadcast company could therefore gain
competitive advantage over their rivals, whether "their"
clubs were part of the negotiations or not.
-
That BSkyB and Granada have agreements (with Leeds, Manchester
City and Liverpool, respectively) to act as those clubs' media
agents, merely exacerbates this concern.
-
However, such agreements also raise a conflict of interest in
that, in BSkyB's case, the leading broadcaster of live football
will effectively be negotiating with itself, and extraordinarily,
be paying itself commission! In this there will be a clear
conflict of interest for the broadcaster: their chief concern will
be to get TV rights for as little as possible; their role as
clubs' agents will be to get as much as possible for these rights
(for which they will then be paying themselves commission).
-
In such a scenario, the clubs (fans, players, managers and
shareholders) will be put at a disadvantage. Whether rights are
sold collectively or individually, the adverse effect on
competition of having leading broadcasters acting on behalf of
clubs will be detrimental to the clubs.
-
There is also the genuine threat that there may soon be enough
broadcast companies with stakes in football clubs who see their
best interests served through the individual sale of TV rights and
thus, through their voting power at the Premier League, be able to
prevent a collective deal, against he long term interests of the
game and its customers as highlighted by the RPC judgement.
Back to Contents
Threats of Dual Ownership by Media
Companies
There is a secondary concern, to do with the ownership of stakes by
media companies in more than one club. BSkyB could own stakes in three
clubs in the Premier League next season if Manchester City get
promoted: they will certainly hold stakes in three clubs competing in
the FA Cup and League Cup. Such a situation appears to be against the
rules of the football authorities (see Section 2, below) and as such
should be dealt with by their regulatory structures, as would be the
case whatever kind of company it involved.
However, dual ownership of clubs by media companies (as opposed to
other companies) raises additional concerns about competition within
the football market, which should be of interest to the competition
authorities. Problems of dual ownership are exacerbated when it comes
to media companies because of TV's strategic importance in terms of
football's finance and the horizontal and vertical integration of the
two. If one media company has an undue interest in more than one club
a number of problems may occur, including:
-
favouritism for clubs they own in terms of numbers of matches
screened, arrangement of fixtures, reporting of games and
disciplinary factors;
-
restrictions on access to players and other staff for other
media companies and platforms;
-
a gradual erosion of the collective and redistributive function
of PL, exacerbating the 'wealth gap' problems of which the MMC
made special mention in their report;
-
a guaranteed access to matches at clubs in which they have an
interest, which are not covered by existing, or future, collective
agreements (e.g. Champions League and UEFA Cup): the more clubs,
the bigger section of the market they are able to secure through
ownership, rather than through fair competitive in the sale of
rights;
-
a suspicion over the validity of results involving clubs owned
in part by the same media company.
Back to Contents
Media Ownership - Summary
The MMC ruled that BSkyB's purchase of Manchester United would give
BSkyB an unfair advantage over their competitors in terms of access to
Premier League TV rights, which would be detrimental to competition in
the pay TV market as a whole and which would adversely affect the
health of British football.
BSkyB's "Plan B", therefore, has been to gain strategic
roles within clubs without leaving themselves open to the scrutiny of
the competition authorities. Coming in quietly through the back door,
rather than the front.
The roles of other media companies pursuing similar strategies does
not lessen the effect of this. In fact, it increases the threat to the
collective negotiation (and therefore the redistribution of) of
Premier League TV rights. This collective and redistributive function
was upheld in the public interest after a lengthy court case
but now needs further safeguarding.
However, it is clear that the strategic nature of the stock
purchases at both floated and private companies raises many of the
same concerns as the BSkyB/MUFC merger. They are deliberately and
explicitly designed to increase the ability of those companies to
secure TV rights. The warnings in the MMC's report, it appears, still
need to be heeded.
Nicholas Finney, a retired member of the MMC panel which ruled
against the BSkyB take-over of Manchester United, has said that
further action is needed by the competition authorities in order to
adequately confront the threat to competition which these purchases
represent.
Furthermore, following the RPC decision, it was widely recognised
by commentators that the judge's support for collective and exclusive
selling of Premier League TV rights was by no means a guarantee that
the new TV deal, in 2001, would be based on these lines. It was
recognised that pressure from television companies and the desire of a
minority of top clubs to increase their share of the money from TV
deals, could lead to a breakdown of the collective arrangements. This
threat to the public interest exists anyway: but it is increased
hugely with the trend in the part ownership of cubs which we have
highlighted here.
In almost every scenario, the public interest, competition within
the pay TV market and the good of football - which Justice Ferris, the
MMC and the Trade Secretary all upheld earlier this year - will be
jeopardised. The Premier League have outlined in correspondence (see
Appendix) that the "the conflict of interest question" is
still to be addressed.
It is therefore the argument of this paper that the Office of Fair
Trading and Department of Trade and Industry should act quickly to
prevent any further part-purchases of football clubs by media
companies and that media companies who currently have stakes in
football clubs should be forced to divest of those shares.
Back to Contents
2. Dual Ownership
Dual Ownership by Media Companies in English
Football
-
BSkyB own 11.1% of Manchester United Plc , who wholly own
Manchester United Football Club, and as such are by far the
company's largest shareholders.
-
BSkyB also own 9.2% of Leeds Sporting who wholly own Leeds
United.
-
BSkyB now also own 9.9% of Manchester City.
-
Furthermore, they have agreements with both Manchester City and
Leeds United to act as "media agents", with seats on
each board, in which they will both have a role in TV rights
negotiations and benefit from any increase in TV revenue they
earn.
-
BSkyB thus enjoy a powerful position in making key decisions in
three clubs.
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Existing Regulations
All three football authorities in this country have clear rules to
prevent clubs being owned by the same person or company.
Traditionally, the basis for these rules is to maintain fair
competition in football and avoid suspicions of clubs coming to
agreements with each other over matches, finance and transfers. Within
the context of the developments outlined above, a new and additional
threat is that dual ownership by media companies will be used to help
them gain access and preferential deals for TV rights. The current
competition rules of the football authorities are outlined below.
The Football Association
The competition rules of the FA Cup, run by the Football
Association, the English game's governing body, are explicit. Rule 30
states:
"a) Save with the prior written permission of the Council no
club may compete in the competition at any stage where that club is
interested in another club which is participating in the competition
or wishing top participate in the competition ("the Second
Club"). The Second Club shall similarly not be permitted to
participate in the competition at any stage.
b) Save with the prior written permission of the Council no club
may compete in the competition at any stage where a person or any
associate of that person is interested in such club and a Second
Club..."
The FA define a club, person, or associate as one who:
"i) holds or deals in... the securities or shares of that
club; or
ii) is a member of that club; or
iii) is involved in any capacity whatsoever in the management or
administration of that club;
or iv) has any power whatsoever to influence the financial,
commercial or business affairs or the administration of that
Club..."
One proviso is given, however (section (d)): the FA disregard the
holding or acquisition of not more than 10% of the issued share
capital. Significantly, though, this restriction applies only
where "those shares are, in the opinion of the Council, held
purely for investment purposes only." Furthermore the additional
factors in BSkyB's ownership of Manchester City and Leeds - their seat
on the board and agreement to act as media agents - seem to over-ride
this condition.
The FA Premier League
The FA Premier League have similarly comprehensive rules regulating
the involvement of persons or companies in more than one club.
"Section S: Miscellaneous...
2. Except with the prior written consent of the Board, no Club or
club may either directly or indirectly:
2.1 hold or deal in the securities or shares of another Club or
club;
2.2 be a member of another Club or club;
2.3 be involved in any capacity whatsoever in the management or
administration of another Club or club;
2.4 have any power whatsoever to influence the management or
administration of another Club or club."
Further, Rule 3 of the Premier League rule book states that
"no person, by himself or with one or more associates, may
at one time, either directly or indirectly be involved in any
capacity whatsoever in the management or administration of more than
one club."
Rule 4 makes a similar distinction to the FA rules with regard to a
10% share holding by saying that:
"no person, by himself or with one or more Associates, may
directly or indirectly hold or acquire any interest in more than 10
per cent of the issued share capital of a Club or club while he or
any Associate is a director of, or directly or indirectly holds any
interest in the share capital of any other Club or club."
The Premier League also follow a similar definition of
"associate" to the FA and their conditions outlined in 2.1 -
2.4 suggest that the 10% rule would be bypassed in relation to
Manchester City and Leeds.
The Football League
The Football League have almost identical rules to the FA, but
state that they are in place to prevent associations and dual
interests which might "undermine the integrity of league
competitions and the reputation, credibility and image of professional
football clubs". Further, the League also outline that they can
force any club in breach of these regulations to "take such
action as is necessary to rectify the breach" with the ultimate
sanction being expulsion from the League.
UEFA
The European governing body, UEFA, have similarly strict guidelines
on associations between clubs. In fact their rules have recently been
invoked in relation to media company Enic's majority stake in Slavia
Prague, part ownership of Glasgow Rangers and full ownership of
Vicenza and AEK Athens. Although UEFA's ruling that two teams in which
Enic had interests could not compete in the same UEFA competition was
challenged within the European Commission by Enic, UEFA's rules were
found to be legal under European law.
It should be re-stated that for all football authorities,
regulations on dual ownership are quite explicit in a number of areas:
- that a 10% or below share holding is not considered to be an
interest;
- that a 10% or more share holding precludes a company having any
interest in another club;
- that any share holding which is not solely for investment
purposes - whether under 10% or not - shall be considered an
interest;
- that any power or agreement to influence the business decisions
of one club shall preclude that person (or company's) interest in
any other club.
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Areas of Transgression
BSkyB's holding in Manchester United, their recent acquisitions at
Leeds and Manchester City, and their strategic roles at the latter two
of these clubs, appear to be a prima face transgression of
competition rules in English football. It should be remembered that
all three clubs compete in the Worthington League Cup; that all three
compete in the FA Cup (except for this season); and that Manchester
United and Leeds compete in the Premier League and Manchester City
will next season (2000-2001), should they gain promotion this season.
There are a number of areas where rules on dual ownership appear to be
being broken:
-
BSkyB's holding of 11.1% of Manchester United should preclude
them from owning any shares in any other football
club with whom Manchester United may be competing.
-
Even if their holding was to be reduced to just below 10%, they
would still be by far the largest shareholder in Manchester United
and as such they could certainly be deemed to have "any power
whatsoever to influence the financial, commercial or business
affairs or the administration of that Club".
-
In any case, BSkyB must have the "prior written
permission" of the football authorities (the Board of the
Premier League, the FA Council or the Board of the Football
League) for holding stakes in more than one club. This has not to
date been given.
-
BSkyB's agreements with Leeds to act as their media agents and
to sit on their board should preclude them from holding any
interest in any other club as this constitutes "any power
whatsoever to influence the financial, commercial or business
affairs or the administration of that Club".
-
Likewise BSkyB's agreement with Manchester City should preclude
any other interest or agreement with any other club.
-
Even if all these agreements were terminated and their holding
in Manchester United was reduced to below 10%, it is clear that
BSkyB's holdings in these clubs are not "held purely
investment purposes" but to be able to influence the sale of
television rights. They "are buying a seat at the negotiating
table" in NTL's words.
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Appropriate Action
BSkyB's ownership stake in Manchester United and its recent
purchase of stakes in Manchester City and Leeds, as well as its
agreements with those clubs, represent a multiple transgression of the
football authorities rules.
These rules were designed to protect the integrity of football. It
absolutely essential to the credibility of the football authorities
regulatory functions that they uphold their own rules regarding the
dual ownership of clubs.
This is particularly important in this case, as indicated above,
because of the nature of the company concerned - that is, that it is
already the dominant market force in sports pay TV and is seeking to
further enhance this position. The importance of TV revenues to
football make this a matter of central concern for the whole game. The
following action is appropriate:
By the Football Association, with regard to the FA Cup:
- If BSkyB wish to maintain their shares in Manchester United,
they should divest of their interests in Leeds and Manchester
City.
- Alternatively, BSkyB should divest of its shares in Manchester
United and one of the other two clubs.
- BSkyB's additional agreements with Manchester City and Leeds
should, if they are not ruled anti-competitive by the competition
authorities, be nullified. Under existing rules BSkyB could
maintain their agreement with one of these clubs, provided that
they divest of their interests in all other clubs.
To ensure that these measures are implemented, the FA should
make it clear that the only alternative is expulsion of the clubs
concerned from the FA Cup.
By the Football League with regard to the League Cup:
- As above for the Football Association.
To ensure that these measures are implemented, the Football
League should make it clear that the only alternative is expulsion
from the Worthington League Cup.
By FA Premier League with regard to the Premier League:
- BSkyB should end their ownership either of 9.2% of Leeds or of
11.1% of Manchester United.
- If BSkyB were to maintain their ownership of 11.1% of Manchester
United, they should end their agreement with Leeds United to act
as "media agents".
- Should Manchester City gain promotion to the Premier League,
BSkyB should be made to either divest of their holdings in
Manchester City and terminate their agreement with that club or
divest of their interests in other Premier League clubs.
- The Premier League should prevent BSkyB buying further stakes in
any other Premier League club and prevent it from making similar
agreements with other Premier League clubs.
To ensure that these measures are implemented, the Premier
League should make it clear that the only alternative is expulsion
from the League.
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Dual Ownership - Summary
The football authorities in the UK and Europe have robust rules to
prevent the dual ownership of clubs and to prevent associations
between clubs. It seems clear that Manchester United, Leeds and
Manchester City are in contravention of these rules relating to three
English competitions - the FA Cup, the Premier League and the League
Cup. Should both Leeds and Manchester United qualify for the Champions
League next season, they may also be in contravention of UEFA rules.
The fact that these dual associations involve the biggest broadcaster
of sport in the UK, BSkyB, and that BSkyB has board membership and
additional agreements with Manchester City and Leeds to act as their
"media agents" makes the case compelling. It raises
additional concerns about the integration of media companies into the
ownership of football to those outlined in the first part of this
report, and places a major question mark over the future finance,
organisation and governance of football.
Enic - A Test Case
The football authorities should be confident of their position in
relation to these matters of dual ownership. The right of membership
associations in football to enforce their rules on dual ownership was
upheld in the Enic test case at the European Commission. This followed
a complaint by Enic when UEFA challenged their ownership of a number
of clubs in different countries which were competing in UEFA
competitions. In a third landmark ruling relating to media companies
in 1999, UEFA were allowed to enforce their own rules preventing dual
ownership of clubs. Their example now needs to be followed in England.
Implications of a Failure to Regulate
There has been considerable debate and discussion in the UK in
relation to the governance of professional football. The Government's
Football Task Force is at present deliberating about what form of
additional regulatory mechanisms are needed in English football. The
developments which this paper outlines, and the contravention of FA,
Premier League and Football League rules which they appear to
represent, are a test for the authorities and their regulatory
function. Quick, unequivocal and firm action is needed to safeguard
both the integrity of professional football in England and its long
term financial health. Although other matters concerning media
companies owning strategic stakes in football clubs ought to be dealt
with by the competition authorities, the concerns of dual ownership
and common associations are in themselves matters for regulation by
the football authorities.
A failure to adequately police their own rules in this case will
not only damage the health of English football but also strengthen the
calls for an independent regulatory structure for football.
Adam Brown
15 November 2020
Dr Adam Brown is a Research Fellow at the Manchester Institute for
Popular Culture, Manchester Metropolitan University. he is a member of
the Government's Football Task Force and is co-author (with Andy
Walsh) of Not For Sale: Manchester United, Murdoch and the Defeat of
BSkyB, published by Mainstream.
Dr Adam Brown
Research Fellow
Manchester Institute for Popular Culture
Manchester Metropolitan University
343 Geoffrey Manton Building
Rosamond St West
Manchester M15 6XL
email: [email protected]
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